India

Agnipath Scheme: The Case for a Longer Military Service Model

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11 min read


By the year-end, about 18,300 Agniveers, three-quarters of the first batch of 24,400 short-term military personnel recruited under the Agnipath Scheme, are due to leave the Armed Forces. Now, just weeks before the first releases, a Cabinet decision has given the remaining 75 per cent of the recruits an extension of two years and opened a route for their regular enrolment. What prompted this volte-face remains unclear. The government insists that the scheme has not been rolled back and that its structure remains in place, but critics call it a retreat.

This article judges the latest government revision from one perspective: what a military needs to fight. It weighs a full rollback of the Agnipath scheme against an incremental refinement on four factors of military effectiveness: trainability and proficiency; unit cohesion, resilience and manpower depth; opportunity cost; and organisational stability. A key additional condition is transparency: the scheme’s claimed gains in readiness, manpower, and cost must be open to scrutiny.

The government has altered the Agnipath Scheme without publicly disclosing the evidence it used to go in for a two-year extension. Except for broad claims of positive feedback for the move, the government has not actually explained why it felt the change was necessary.

The extension may be labelled as an incremental upgrade, but it does not settle the question as to whether the design is sound. And, neither a full rollback nor a partial refinement resolves all four problems. Their respective strengths and weaknesses suggest that a longer-service alternative plan is worth examining.

What the extension means

The four-year tenure survives. So does the merit-based retention at year four: up to a quarter of the recruits can move into the regular cadre. What has changed is the fate of the remaining 75 per cent. Instead of leaving, they have now been offered two more years, after which they get an option for regular enrolment. Thus, they might get regular service, but only after two more years of scrutiny, competition, and uncertainty.

Officials say that those who are willing and meet the prescribed fitness, discipline, and selection standards will be absorbed, without any limit on the number of recruitments.

The seniority rules for personnel taken in at the same time but absorbed after four and six years will require formal clarification. A two-tiered hierarchical seniority within the same intake batch will pose its own challenges.

Whether this revision amounts to a rollback depends on what happens in year six. If nearly every Agniveer joins the regular cadre, the scheme’s core assumption and premise—a younger force with higher turnover—will be diluted.

Against this backdrop, two options frame the debate. The first is to roll back the scheme and return to regular long-tenure recruitment, with a younger age of entry. The other is to retain the present scheme and adjust it incrementally through periodic reviews.

An Agniveer embraces family members during a passing-out parade, in Patna on May 31, 2026.

An Agniveer embraces family members during a passing-out parade, in Patna on May 31, 2026.
| Photo Credit:
PTI

The case for rollback rests on a simple claim. The earlier system met the armed forces requirements through multiple operations and long deployments. Any major departure, therefore, requires evidence that the earlier system had become deficient. While the Kargil Review Committee raised concerns about the age of Commanding Officers in the armed forces, no public study has shown that the rank and file were not youthful enough. If the four-year, high-churn Agnipath model creates structural problems of training, cohesion, manpower depth, and organisational stability, then it will not work even with incremental upgrades.

The first concern is training standards. Agniveers get six months of basic training inside a four-year term, followed by specialist training. This training pipeline can use up much of the tenure, leaving little time for achieving full combat proficiency. This is least desirable for a force that is using newer and more complex equipment with each day. The extension raises a further training dilemma: how much specialist training should be given to personnel who may leave at year six?

The second concern is cohesion, resilience, and manpower depth. An internal army assessment, reported in June 2024, found Agniveers lacking camaraderie as they compete among themselves to be among the 25 per cent of recruits who are retained. This finding predates the new extension, but veterans argue that trust is built through shared lives and hardships, and short tenures dilute that. A combat unit is not built in four years; it is built in 15 years of living, training, and fighting together.

Ladakh in 2020 showed the nation that toughness may last a day, but resilience—the ability to sustain men, weapons, and logistics for months at high altitudes while retaining the ability to fight—takes years to build.

Manpower depth—that is, the trained pool needed to sustain units through losses, rotations, and expansions—shrinks in a four-year churn situation. Veterans warn that the regimental system would suffer, hurting the force’s morale and motivation in the long term.

Additionally, competing with one’s peers for retention places an avoidable strain on relationships and conduct within the unit or battalion, more so if the pay and ranks of candidates from the same intake are not regularised.

Cost is the third concern. The scheme’s unstated objective was to rein in salary and pension bills. But the extension’s offer of a near-universal absorption at year six will test that logic, although pension effects will emerge only when the first batch reaches retirement age. Moving from a no-pension liability to a pension-bearing regular-service liability would mark a major departure from the original fiscal design.

Organisational stability is the fourth concern. Repeated changes risk leaving every cohort (regular entry; Agniveer 4+ entry; Agniveer 6+ entry; and the new batches) under a different set of rules. A battalion commanding officer must manage annual retention screenings for multiple Agniveer batches at the cost of focussing on pressing operational matters. The Rashtriya Rifles experience shows how counterinsurgency depends on seasoned personnel, local knowledge, and institutional memory, and a rapid churn makes these advantages harder to accumulate.

A rollback of the scheme also has costs. Over 3 lakh Agniveers are serving, and the Army faces an estimated shortfall of 1.8 lakh personnel. Returning to the old system will create another cohort and require a new recruitment pipeline, which will take time to deliver.

Incremental reforms

Those who argue for rollback point to the structural flaws in Agnipath’s design. Others argue for incremental reforms, for repairs to the evident weaknesses in the two-year extension idea without discarding Agnipath itself. But this has its limitations.

Also, a soldier who leaves after training, just as he becomes proficient, wastes the investment that the state has made in him. Retaining 75 per cent for two more years raises the return on training investment but it does not improve the training itself.

The extension is likely to ease the competition to be among the 25 per cent, but fitness and discipline screening will continue to create some competition among the remaining 75 per cent. If the rank and file are preoccupied with proving themselves, a unit commander risks leading an outfit driven by individual retention rather than unit cohesion. The scheme, therefore, has serious weaknesses.

The Chief of Defence Staff cited positive feedback on performance and said that the Agnipath scheme was never meant to be final and would face continuous reviews. Now, having recommended the extension, the services must bear its operational consequences and risks. But repeated policy tweaks without a final design can weaken the military system and its work culture.

India’s context is distinct: it needs a volunteer army on perpetually hostile borders, where readiness depends on terrain-specific skills, structure, and equipment. Agnipath is yet to show that it can produce specialist proficiency, preserve cohesion, restrain costs, and give the services a stable personnel structure.

Rollback would restore a proven system, but would revert to the old flaws and create yet another recruitment regime. The current scheme does not demonstrate a sound design, which is why the country should examine a longer-service model that retains aspects of both systems.

One possible such alternative is an eight-plus-seven model. It would retain Agniveer entry but replace the four-year intake with an initial engagement of eight years. At its end, selected personnel could serve a further seven years in regular service according to rank and trade needs. Those not selected at year eight would enter a defined seven-year reserve liability, with annual training and mobilisation obligations. At the 15-year point, a fixed proportion could continue for senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) and junior commissioned officer (JCO) appointments. Such an arrangement could build a trained base after eight years and give selected personnel the continuity that a four-year churn denies.

The proposal adapts India’s earlier colour-and-reserve service system, which combined active service with reserve liability. Eight years meets today’s training and proficiency requirements; the next seven years could retain trained personnel in regular service to fill NCO ranks, or in reserve for mobilisation. Legislation would have to specify selection at year eight, terminal benefits, and whether reserve service counts towards pension. It has prima facie advantages, but its operational and fiscal details would require departmental testing and evaluation.

Singapore combines two years of compulsory full-time service with 10 years in the reserve. Israel combines compulsory service with reserve liability and career retention for specialist and command roles. The US combines an initial active-duty contract with an eight-year service obligation, while re-enlistment builds its career force. These examples show that short initial service must either lead to usable reserve liability or to selective career retention.

The model faces a fiscal test. But a soldier serving until his mid-30s surely deserves an honourable terminal package, like his counterparts in the paramilitary forces. The relevant comparison is not between a no-pension model and a pension-costed model: it is the lifetime cost of retaining a trained, committed soldier against the repeated cost of recruiting, training, employing, and replacing.

Youths from different districts of Karnataka participated in a run that was part of the Agnipath recruitment rally, in Shivamogga on August 23, 2024.

Youths from different districts of Karnataka participated in a run that was part of the Agnipath recruitment rally, in Shivamogga on August 23, 2024.
| Photo Credit:
BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT

An obvious objection is that another major change will affect army readiness, especially along the northern borders. Any longer-service model must first meet operational requirements, and then its fiscal feasibility must be assessed.

If the two-year extension is yet another band-aid solution, then it is clear that the Agnipath design is still not final. Military policy cannot be separated from the social obligation the state owes to those who serve under extreme hardship and danger. A system that recruits young people for short service and then throws them back into an uncertain labour market affects not only the welfare and morale of these recruits but also its own recruitment quality and legitimacy.

Steps needed

Three steps are necessary. First, the government should publish the aggregated anonymised data that is needed to judge whether the extension works. The data should include training standards, cohesion and disciplinary surveys, fiscal savings, age profile, and manpower shortfalls.

The positive feedback being reported from the initial batches could be anecdotal and misleading: with no recruitment for two years before the Agniveer intake and a two-year age relaxation, the catchment base was large and the best were selected. Also, technical proficiency needs quantifying, and the opportunity costs of delayed specialisation and repeated new recruit training need to be factored in.

Second, an independent study must be commissioned to determine whether a longer-service alternative model meets operational requirements and to assess its fiscal implications before it is sent to Parliament for debate and legislation.

Third, those who still leave service need credible resettlement opportunities. The Ministry of Home Affairs, State governments, and other Ministries that have announced reservations or recruitment preferences must translate those commitments into actual employment in the Central Armed Police Forces, Assam Rifles, and State police forces. A separate nodal agency at the Ministry of Labour should monitor placements and publish department-wise absorptions.

If such a study finds the longer-term model operationally sound and fiscally sustainable, Parliament should finalise the eight-plus-seven-year design soon. Repeated changes to the recruitment pattern undermine the country’s force readiness and resilience.

Harinder Singh, a former corps commander, established the Directorate of Indian Army Veterans (DIAV) in 2014.

Also Read | Union government announces scheme to recruit youth for the Armed Forces for a four-year period

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