The world has never been so disorderly, not since the end of the Second World War. Conflicts are getting prolonged, global supply chains are getting stretched, free navigation through the seas is being held hostage to critical choke points<\/a> that have been weaponised, and global institutions like the UN and the WTO do not seem to matter any more.<\/p>\n Even the G20, once considered an effective platform for global economic coordination, is finding it difficult to reconcile competing national agendas. Multilateralism is increasingly giving way to transactional diplomacy and growth of many regional and \u201cnon-West\u201d platforms like the BRICS<\/a> and SCO.<\/p>\n Plus, a delicate balance of power that had been preserved, mostly through the economic and military dominance of the West led by the US, too is crumbling fast. The recent election results of midterm elections in the US have handed President Donald Trump the worst possible defeat, which leaves him very little legroom to drive his agenda for the remaining half of the presidency. Plus, the war in Iran, which has now been publicly acknowledged as a major factor for his election debacle, does not seem to be ending soon, and the US is finding it difficult to orchestrate an off-ramp.<\/p>\n It is against this backdrop that the Leaders\u2019 Summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, popularly known as the Quad, is scheduled to be held in Manila, Philippines, on November 17, 2026. This meeting, to be held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, will be the first leaders\u2019 summit since the one in Wilmington, US, in September 2024.<\/p>\n India was expected to host the 2025 summit, but that did not materialise owing to scheduling difficulties and emerging differences, mainly due to Trump\u2019s unilateral economic policies, which impacted most of the Quad partners, directly or indirectly. This is also the first time that a Quad Summit will be held in a non-Quad country.<\/p>\n \n In this image posted on September 3, 2026, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Secretary Elly Lawson, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, Japan’s Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Hiroyuki Namazu, and US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor during the Quad Sherpas meeting in New Delhi. The Quad leaders, therefore, are meeting at a pivotal time in the history when not only is the relevance and importance of the Quad under scrutiny, this grouping will also have to decide how, going ahead, it will reaffirm the shared commitment to \u201ca free and open Indo-Pacific that allows countries to develop resilience and strengthen capacity to determine their own paths\u201d, as the Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting said in a joint statement issued on May 26, 2026.<\/p>\n Also, the Quad will have to decide how it plans to collectively \u201coppose any destabilising or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, including by force or coercion, which escalate tensions and undermine regional peace and stability\u201d.<\/p>\n The origins of the Quad were strikingly different from the expectations from the grouping today. They can be traced to the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. In its aftermath, India, the US, Japan, and Australia came together to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and collectively contributed more than 40,000 emergency responders, assisting millions of people across the affected region.<\/p>\n Building on this successful cooperation and looking ahead to a growing challenge from an aggressive China, the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe put forward the idea of institutionalising this grouping for closer cooperation on humanitarian and developmental issues, especially in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n In May 2007, the four countries held their first quadrilateral dialogue on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila. The initiative, however, lost momentum even before it could fructify into something meaningful. It became an active grouping only in 2017, after Trump became US President in January that year. In 2019, it was elevated to the Foreign Ministers\u2019 level, and in March 2021, under US President Joe Biden, the four leaders held their first virtual summit.<\/p>\n At the last summit in September 2024, the Quad announced a number of initiatives. On the health front, Quad Cancer Moonshot was launched to fight the disease. A new regional Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific or MAITRI was announced to monitor and secure sea waters, enforce laws, and deter unlawful behaviour.<\/p>\n Plus, there were announcements on cooperation in development of infrastructure in ports across the Indo-Pacific, a $140 million commitment toward undersea cable investments and protection, and the establishment of a Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network. All were aimed at securing a free Indo-Pacific and to counter an increasingly aggressive Chinese posture in the South and East China Seas.<\/p>\n There is little doubt that it was China\u2019s rise that provided the strategic impetus for the revival of the Quad in 2017. However, the four partner countries have different ways in which they often perceive the China challenge and its growing economic and military assertiveness.<\/p>\n For Japan, the challenge is nearer and impinges on its national security, especially in the East China Sea and around the Senkaku Islands. Repeated Chinese assertiveness has, in fact, forced a rethink in Japan on its overall security doctrine.<\/p>\n Australia views China through a dual lens of strategic competition and deep economic interdependence\u2014often described as a balance between \u201ccontestation and engagement\u201d. It has deep economic linkages with China but is deeply concerned with China\u2019s rapid naval expansion, military activities in the South and East China Seas, and frequent as well as unsafe air intercepts of Australian aircraft.<\/p>\n The US views China as its principal strategic competitor, but it is finding it difficult to completely disengage and confront China given the deep economic dependencies as well as China\u2019s stranglehold over critical minerals.<\/p>\n India, meanwhile, faces a direct military challenge along the Himalayan border, where the 2020 Galwan confrontation fundamentally altered bilateral relations. China\u2019s support to Pakistan, both military and economic, is also of grave concern. The huge trade imbalance and the dependencies on China for many technologies, raw material, and critical minerals make it difficult for India to see China only from a hard security lens, one of the reasons for a deliberate re-engagement since the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit of 2025.<\/p>\n It will, thus, be a challenge for the Quad to come up with a direct and confrontational strategy on China, the reason why even at the previous summits the focus of the statements has been more on cooperative initiatives than on directly targeting China.<\/p>\n For decades, the US has served as the principal architect and guarantor of the international order through its military alliances, security partnerships, and huge economic influence. However, developments in recent years have exposed the limitations of its power. The country\u2019s involvement in conflicts in Europe and West Asia, the inability to secure lasting political settlements, and the growing unpredictability of its foreign policy priorities have raised questions about its capacity to manage multiple geopolitical challenges simultaneously.<\/p>\n \n Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne hold a news conference in Melbourne on February 12, 2022 after meetings were held between Australia, India, Japan, and the US. More importantly, the Trump administration\u2019s transactional approach to international partnerships, unilateral trade tariffs, pressure on partners to shoulder greater security responsibilities, and a willingness to subordinate long-term strategic considerations to immediate economic interests are making the US an unpredictable partner.<\/p>\n India, too, is experiencing it as differences over trade, tariffs, Pakistan, and other bilateral issues have affected the political atmosphere. The fact that the leaders, especially the US, could not agree to convene the Quad leaders\u2019 summit in 2025 in India is yet another signal of friction.<\/p>\n There is also the larger question of US policy towards China and its approach that combines strategic competition with selective engagement. While the US continues to regard China as its principal competitor, its willingness to negotiate with it on trade and other issues creates uncertainty on its possible clash with the Quad\u2019s strategic objectives. The meeting of the two leaders, twice in a few months in this year, including a state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Washington in September, is illustrative of it.<\/p>\n The summit in Manila, which is being watched closely, is an opportunity to move beyond broad declarations and establish a more focused agenda. For Trump too, it is a moment to re-establish lost ground over conflicts and elections in the past few months.<\/p>\n So, what can this summit deliver? First, it should focus on building momentum on maritime security, which must become its principal operational priority. The Indian and Pacific Oceans are increasingly becoming contested strategic spaces. The recent conflicts and the weaponisation of maritime sea-lanes and choke points have made this absolutely vital. The Quad should expand on previous announcements and focus on intelligence-sharing, strengthen coast guard cooperation, and develop mechanisms to respond collectively to threats to maritime commerce.<\/p>\n Economic cooperation and security could be the next important priority. Critical minerals, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, energy security, digital infrastructure and resilient supply chains offer considerable scope for cooperation.<\/p>\n The Quad must demonstrate that it can deliver investments and infrastructure at a scale that offers regional countries a credible alternative to excessive dependence on China.<\/p>\n Emerging and critical technologies as well as non-conventional security threats have to receive due attention. AI, cyber threats, space-based capabilities, and autonomous systems like drones as well as new forms of terror will increasingly shape the security environment. Cooperation in these domains could give the Quad a distinct advantage.<\/p>\n With its key focus on the Indo-Pacific, the Quad should develop a natural and institutional relationship with ASEAN, keeping ASEAN centrality as a guiding principle.<\/p>\n For India, a strong Quad offers tremendous leverage in the region. The experience of recent wars in West Asia and Europe and the vulnerability of sea trade to coercion, especially the Malacca Straits, is a point of concern for India, and therefore the country needs to strengthen maritime security mechanisms to keep Chinese expansion in check. The ongoing development of the Greater Nicobar project could become a key anchor towards this in the future. It also complements India\u2019s Act East Policy, its SAGAR vision for the Indian Ocean, and its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative.<\/p>\n The Quad now faces a defining moment. It can choose to remain an informal consultative mechanism among the four countries or it can evolve into a credible actionable platform for regional security, economic resilience and stability.<\/p>\n The world definitely does not need another grouping that merely meets to express concerns and make loud announcements without developing capacities to translate those commitments into action. The real test of the Quad will not be how strongly its members speak about China but how effectively they can shape the future of the Indo-Pacific. But first, it must rediscover its purpose.<\/p>\n Col. Rajeev Agarwal (retired) is a strategic affairs and security analyst. He is also the author of Between Tehran and Tel Aviv: Gaza\u2019s Story of Unending War.<\/i><\/p>\n Also Read | Will a revived Quad balance the scales of power in the Indo-Pacific?<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Also Read | India now a major defence partner for the US as it gangs up on China<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n![\"In](\"https:\/\/fl-i.thgim.com\/public\/incoming\/aukc3e\/article71701547.ece\/alternates\/FREE_1200\/quad-sherpas-2026.jpg\" "\\"In")
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\n X.com\/@USAmbIndia\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\nGenesis of Quad<\/h3>\n
The China question<\/h3>\n
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\n HAMISH BLAIR\/AP\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\nWhat can the Quad deliver?<\/h3>\n