On September 22, 2006, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment<\/a> in Prakash Singh v. Union of India.<\/i> Diagnosing political interference as the core affliction of Indian policing<\/a>, the court sought to insulate officers from arbitrary pressure, strengthen accountability, and transform a colonial force into a professional service responsive to the people.<\/p>\n Drawing on the recommendations of the National Police Commission (1977\u201381); the Ribeiro (1998), Padmanabhaiah (2000), and Malimath (2003) Committees; and the Model Police Act (2006) Drafting Committee under Soli Sorabjee, the court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to issue seven binding directives to operate until competent legislatures enacted appropriate legislation.<\/p>\n First, each State was to establish a State Security Commission (SSC), chaired by the Chief Minister or the Home Minister, with other members chosen to ensure independence from government control. The commission would be tasked with formulating broad policy and evaluating police performance, with its recommendations made binding. While most States did establish SSCs, they undercut their autonomy by packing them with official nominees and rendering their recommendations purely advisory.<\/p>\n Second, the DGP\/Head of Police Force (HOPF) was to be chosen by the State from a panel of the three senior-most IPS officers shortlisted on merit by a committee comprising the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) Chairman, the Union Home Secretary, and the State Chief Secretary, with a minimum two-year tenure irrespective of superannuation.<\/p>\n Also Read | Order without force<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Despite Supreme Court reiterations and contempt notices, compliance has been patchy. States devised ingenious evasions: appointing \u201cacting HOPFs\u201d for extended periods, creating parallel posts to wield real power while reducing the HOPF to a figurehead, forcing premature retirements, sending delayed panels, and doctoring appraisal reports to exclude unwanted officers.<\/p>\n Given the age pyramid, the two-year tenure rule locks out two or three subsequent batches from the top post, breeding demoralisation, while failing to secure genuine independence for the incumbent.<\/p>\n Third, the court mandated a minimum tenure of two years for operational field officers such as Zonal Inspectors General, Range Deputy Inspectors General, District Superintendents of Police (SPs), and station house officers to curb arbitrary transfers.<\/p>\n Fourth, investigation was to be operationally separated from law and order duties to promote specialised, efficient policing\u2014initially in cities with a population of at least 10 lakh. Implementation remains largely cosmetic due to severe personnel shortages, unspecialised cadres, and daily crisis management.<\/p>\n Fifth, each State was directed to establish a Police Establishment Board (PEB) comprising the DGP and four senior officers to decide transfers and promotions up to the Deputy Superintendent of Police rank and recommend them for the SP rank and above. Although these have been constituted in most States, they function largely as a rubber stamp, clearing transfers only after informal political clearance.<\/p>\n Sixth, independent Police Complaints Authorities (PCAs) were mandated at State and district levels, chaired by a retired High Court judge and district judge respectively, to inquire into serious police misconduct. Many exist only on paper, starved of investigative staff, funds, and public trust.<\/p>\n \n At the Integrated Command and Control Centre in Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, where police personnel used latest technology to manage the massive crowds at the Magh Mela on January 15, 2026. Seventh, the court directed the Centre to establish a National Security Commission to prepare panels for the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet to select chiefs of Central police organisations such as the Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Sashastra Seema Bal, with a minimum two-year tenure.<\/p>\n On January 2, 2007, the Centre bypassed this directive by notifying an internal ministerial body, called the Committee on National Security and Central Police Personnel Welfare, which the court flagged as non-compliant on January 11. The Union Home Ministry and Cabinet continue to control selections, routinely appointing chiefs with mere months of residual service and leaving the directive hollow.<\/p>\n In Prakash Singh<\/i>, the Supreme Court transformed what was ostensibly an interim judgment into two decades of \u201ccontinuing mandamus\u201d, retaining the matter on its active docket to supervise nationwide police personnel administration directly from the bench.<\/p>\n This protracted oversight unfolded through monitoring committees, supplemental directions, and rolling contempt proceedings.<\/p>\n In May 2008, the court constituted the Justice K.T. Thomas Committee to audit compliance across States. In its July 3, 2018, order, it barred the widespread practice of appointing \u201cacting DGPs\u201d and ordered States to send empanelment proposals to the UPSC at least three months before an incumbent\u2019s retirement. On March 13, 2019, it mandated that the UPSC empanel only officers possessing a minimum residual service of six months. In 2026, the court issued contempt show-cause notices to multiple non-compliant States even as the core constitutional challenge to State Police Acts in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 286 of 2013, a PIL petition concerning police reforms, languishes without final adjudication.<\/p>\n States complied in form but defied in substance, trapping the court in endless supervisory governance. Such \u201ccontinuing mandamus\u201d imperils both institutions: the judiciary, whose authority ebbs when compliance falters, and the legislature, whose will to legislate withers when overshadowed by judicial command.<\/p>\n Under Articles 163 and 164 of the Constitution, a State\u2019s Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister, is collectively responsible to the legislature and politically answerable to the electorate for State governance, including public order, security, and police conduct. Democratic accountability, therefore, demands that the elected executive retain effective authority over police leadership and personnel administration.<\/p>\n On this count, the core premise of Prakash Singh, t<\/i>hat the police should be insulated from the political executive, was fundamentally flawed. The judgment fractured the constitutional chain of accountability by interposing unelected bodies like SSCs, PEBs, and PCAs\u2014lacking both democratic legitimacy and institutional credibility\u2014between the political executive and the police.<\/p>\n Comparative international practice highlights the anomaly. In the US, sheriffs are directly elected in many jurisdictions while police chiefs are accountable to elected Mayors or Governors. In Canada, Australia, and Germany, policing is overseen by provincial or State Ministers. Even in the UK, directly elected police and crime commissioners appoint chief constables and set policing priorities and budgets, while the Metropolitan Police Commissioner reports to the Mayor of London.<\/p>\n That police officers must investigate crime independently <\/i>of political or executive superiors was well-settled law decades before Prakash Singh.<\/i> From the Privy Council\u2019s ruling in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad <\/i>(1944) to the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Abhinandan Jha <\/i>v. Dinesh Mishra (<\/i>1968), State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha <\/i>(1980), and Vineet Narain v. Union of India <\/i>(1998), the law has been unambiguous: forming an independent opinion on evidence and submitting the final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive statutory domain of the investigating officer.<\/p>\n As Lord Denning famously ruled in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn <\/i>(1968), endorsed in Vineet Narain,<\/i> the investigating officer is the servant of the law alone, immune from executive command. Prakash Singh <\/i>added nothing new to the law on investigative independence.<\/p>\n Beyond criminal procedure, it is also a well-settled doctrine of general administrative law\u2014dating from Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji <\/i>(1952) through State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan Sharma <\/i>(1966) to Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar <\/i>(1969)\u2014that where a statute vests a specific power, duty, or discretion in a designated officer, that officer alone must exercise it independently.<\/p>\n \n Paying tribute to the policemen who laid down their lives in the line of duty, during Police Commemoration Day at a police station near Amritsar on October 21, 2026. Any order passed at the command, instruction, or dictation of an executive or political superior is an unlawful abdication of statutory power and a legal nullity.<\/p>\n Despite this judicial protection, if some officers succumb to unlawful political pressure or solicit informal political clearance on matters entrusted exclusively to their statutory discretion, it reflects a failure of individual courage and professional integrity, a moral flaw that no judicial decree can cure. Prakash Singh\u2019s<\/i> layers of bureaucratic insulation cannot substitute for character.<\/p>\n In Prakash Singh<\/i>, the Supreme Court erred by conflating investigative autonomy with blanket institutional insulation. In a parliamentary democracy, an armed coercive force must remain subject to civilian oversight lest it transform into a modern Praetorian Guard: an unaccountable, self-governing syndicate that is a law unto itself.<\/p>\n India\u2019s States are vast and varied. Uttar Pradesh\u2019s policing challenges bear little resemblance to Keralam\u2019s; border States contend with insurgency while metropolitan hubs battle sophisticated cybercrime and financial fraud. Federalism exists precisely to let States tailor solutions suited to their unique challenges.<\/p>\n Prakash Singh <\/i>undermines this by imposing a one-size-fits-all template from the bench. It subverts the principle affirmed by the nine-judge bench in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India <\/i>(1994) that federalism forms part of the Constitution\u2019s basic structure.<\/p>\n The Seventh Schedule places \u201cPublic order\u201d and \u201cPolice\u201d in Entries 1 and 2 of the State List, subject only to Entry 2A of the Union List governing Central armed force deployment in aid of civil power. This allocation recognises that ordinary policing is principally a State responsibility, leaving substantive autonomy for State legislatures to shape police institutions suited to local conditions.<\/p>\n Involving the UPSC in selecting a State\u2019s DGP\/HOPF was an unprecedented judicial innovation. The UPSC\u2019s remit under Article 320 is restricted to Union recruitments and advisory disciplinary functions. Further, including the Union Home Secretary injected Central executive influence into what had always been an exclusive State domain.<\/p>\n A Chief Minister or State Home Minister, with intimate knowledge of officers\u2019 competence, integrity, temperament, and public credibility is far better placed to assess suitability than distant authorities in Delhi, who rely almost entirely on often unreliable annual performance assessment reports\u2014instruments notoriously prone to grade inflation. Indeed, the Union government itself recognised their inadequacy by introducing 360-degree evaluations for Central empanelment.<\/p>\n While the Tamil Nadu Police (Reform) Act, 2013, allows a shortlist of five names, the UPSC insists on three, citing Prakash Singh.<\/i> Other States deviating from the judgment have faced similar bottlenecks.<\/p>\n The court\u2019s promise that directives would yield once \u201clegislation is enacted\u201d has proved illusory; instead, they have hardened into an unyielding straitjacket. By treating statutory deviations as contempt, the court has pre-empted democratic debate, leaving State Legislatures virtually no sovereign space to tailor policing to regional realities. This friction is magnified by a stark double standard. While States face rolling contempt notices for minor deviations from judicial mandates, the Union has largely disregarded the directive on the National Security Commission for its own vast policing apparatus. In effect, States are placed under judicial receivership, while the Union\u2019s discretion remains entirely untouched.<\/p>\n Another striking asymmetry lies in the treatment of comparable posts. The UPSC and the Union government play no role\u2014rightly so\u2014in appointing a State\u2019s Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Finance Secretary, or Principal Chief Conservator of Forests. All these positions belong to the All-India Services and are as critical and vulnerable to political pressure as the DGP\/HOPF, if not more. Why, then, is the police chief alone singled out for judicial guardianship? The incongruities of Prakash Singh <\/i>demonstrate why enduring police reform must emerge from elected legislatures and accountable executives, not from judicial fiat.<\/p>\n While the Constitution does not mandate a rigid separation of powers, it does recognise distinct domains: legislatures design policies, executives administer them, and courts interpret laws and protect fundamental rights. Judicial review is a constitutional shield against legislative and executive overreach, not a licence to govern from the bench.<\/p>\n The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed these boundaries. In Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu & Kashmir <\/i>(1989), a Constitution Bench held that judicial review cannot become an instrument to dictate policy or supervise administrative functions.<\/p>\n \n During the passing-out parade of Madhya Pradesh Deputy Superintendents of Police, in Bhopal on November 3, 2026. In Balco Employees\u2019 Union v. Union of India<\/i> (2002), the court cautioned judges against substituting their own views for the wisdom of elected governments on policy matters. Reaffirming this restraint in Census Commissioner v. R. Krishnamurthy<\/i> (2015), it refused to mandate a caste census, declaring policy choices off-limits to judicial direction.<\/p>\n In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, Shimla <\/i>(1985),<\/i> it held that courts cannot issue a mandamus compelling a legislature to enact a specific law.<\/p>\n Concurrently, however, an activist counter-tradition emerged: framing bench-made policy codes under the guise of \u201cgap-filling\u201d\u2014from Vishaka <\/i>and Ors v. State of Rajasthan (<\/i>1997) through T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India <\/i>(1996) to Vineet Narain <\/i>(1998). Prakash Singh <\/i>was an egregious extension, mandating police oversight commissions, prescribing appointment procedures, and framing tenure rules.<\/p>\n The court justified this under Article 142 by drawing an incorrect analogy with Vishaka <\/i>(1997). Vishaka <\/i>addressed a statutory vacuum regarding workplace sexual harassment. Policing, by contrast, was an occupied statutory field governed by the Police Act of 1861 and various State enactments.<\/p>\n Multiple Constitution Benches have ruled that Article 142 cannot supplant or contradict substantive statutory law.<\/p>\n In Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner (1963),<\/i> a five-judge bench held that Article 142 orders cannot be inconsistent with substantive statutory provisions. In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998),<\/i> another five-judge bench ruled that Article 142 was curative, not legislative: it cannot \u201csupplant substantive law\u201d or build a new legal edifice where statutory provisions already operate.<\/p>\n The three-judge bench in Prakash Singh,<\/i> therefore, erred in invoking Article 142 to override an existing legislative regime.<\/p>\n Finally, Prakash Singh<\/i> transformed expert committee recommendations into binding law, bypassing the essential test of political debate.<\/p>\n Technocracy may advise, but only democracy can decide. Expert opinion may illuminate policy, but it cannot substitute for legislative deliberation.<\/p>\n![\"At](\"https:\/\/fl-i.thgim.com\/public\/incoming\/b0kvxh\/article71685863.ece\/alternates\/FREE_1200\/control-centre-prayagraj.jpg\" "\\"At")
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\n RAVI PRAKASH\/ANI\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\nFrom interim directions to perpetual supervision<\/h3>\n
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\n SHIVA SHARMA\/PTI\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\nFedralism undermined<\/h3>\n
Separation of powers breached<\/h3>\n
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\n Sanjeev Gupta\/ANI\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\n